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COMMENT:  GENERAL  COMPETITIVE  ANALYSIS  IN  AN 
ECONOMY  WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION* 
BY  HAROLD  LINH  COLE 
This note corrects a misunderstanding in Prescott and Townsend (1984) by 
pointing out that random allocation  rules can lead to  Pareto dominating allo- 
cations  even  when  the set  of  incentive compatible  and  resource feasible allo- 
cations are convex under deterministic allocation rules. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Prescott  and  Townsend  (1984) extend  the  literature on  general equilibrium 
theory to economies in which agents have private information about their prefer- 
ences. They examine the extent to which the classical welfare theorems carry over 
in this environment. The existence of nonverifiable information imposes limits on 
the economy's contract structure. Contracts cannot be written to require an agent 
to reveal information unless truthful revelation is optimal. Incentive compatiblity 
constraints, typically nonlinear, are thereby introduced into  the corresponding 
planner's problem. As a result, the space of feasible deterministic allocations  is 
typically  not  convex.  The  authors  circumvent  this  problem  by  allowing  for 
random allocations, where the planner is choosing  over the space of probability 
distributions of consumption allocations. The incentive compatibility constraints 
in  this  space  are linear in  the  planner's choice  variables, rendering the  set  of 
feasible consumption  allocations  convex.  Some  of  the attainable  random allo- 
cations  Pareto  dominate  the  set  of incentive-feasible allocations  attainable via 
deterministic allocation rules. 
Randomized  allocations  have  two  functions.  They  convexify  the  planner's 
choice  set, and they may allow for Pareto superior allocations  to  be achieved. 
Prescott  and  Townsend's  presentation may  leave  readers with  the  misleading 
conclusion that the nonconvexity of the choice set under deterministic allocations 
is necessary for random allocations  to  be Pareto superior. But, one can attain 
Pareto superior allocations with lotteries even when the choice set under deter- 
ministic  allocation  rules is  convex.  This  note  demonstrates  that  Prescott  and 
Townsend's own example has this property. 
2.  MODEL 
Consider an economy  with two  periods, one consumption  good,  and a con- 
tinuum of agents. In the second period agents may be of two types. In the first 
period agents are endowed with e of the perfectly storable consumption  good. 
*  Manuscript received February 1986; revised January 1987. 
249 250  HAROLD  LINH  COLE 
Agents care only about their second period consumption. Agents of type 1 have 
preferences given by the strictly concave function  V(c(l)), where c(1) denotes the 
consumption of the type 1 agent. Agents of type 2 have preferences  given by Oc(2). 
Assume that V'(e) <  0, V'(oo) = 0, and V'(O)  =  oo. Assume that a proportion cc  of 
the agents will be of type 1, and that (1 -  a) will be of type 2. 
The resource constraint of the economy can be expressed as: 
(1)  cxc(1)  +  (1 -  c)c(2)  <  e. 
The ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation, [c*(1), c*(2)] (when all of the agents are 
given  equal  weight  in  the  planner's objective  function),  would  maximize  an 
agent's expected utility conditional on his knowing the probabilities of each type. 
When agents' types are public knowledge in period two, the optimal allocation 
would be such that equation (1) and the following condition were simultaneously 
satisfied: 
(2)  V'(c*(2)) =  0. 
Given our assumptions about preferences,  this would imply that c*(2) > c*(1). 
In the optimal allocation  when agents' types are public information we may 
differentiate between the two types of agents in a manner which is not feasible if 
agents' types are private information. To  see this note  that an agent of type  1 
would strictly prefer to receive the type 2 bundle since c*(2) > c*(1). In order for 
an  allocation  to  be incentive compatible  when  agents' types are private infor- 
mation it must be the case that agents weakly prefer their own bundle to that of 
any other agent. Thus we must have: 
(3)  V(c(l)) ?  V(c(2)) 
(4)  Oc(2)  ?  Oc(  1). 
With one consumption  good  the incentive feasible set is always convex since 
these constraints will simply imply that: 
(3')  c(l) ?  c(2) 
(4')  c(2) ?  c(1). 
As long  as agents' preferences are strictly increasing in the consumption  good, 
these two constraints imply that c(1) = c(2). In other words, the set of incentive 
compatible  allocations  is  the 45  degree line in  Diagram  1. The  feasible set  of 
consumption allocations is the intersection of the incentive and resource feasible 
sets, and consists  of  the line segment from (0, 0)  to  (e, e). Note  that  this is  a 
convex  set. Since agents' utilities are increasing in  the consumption  good,  the 
constrained Pareto optimal allocation will consist of the point (e, e). 
To see how one can achieve Pareto superior allocations when one allows for 
random allocation  rules, consider the following  allocation  rule which offers an 
agent a choice between a certain level of the consumption  good,  denoted by n, 
and a lottery in which he receives consumption m(1) with probability Xt or con- 
sumption m(2) with probability (1 -  i).  If we assume that type  1 agents choose 
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DIAGRAM  1 
constraint will be given by: 
(5)  ocn  + (1 - oc)[rnm(1)  + (1 -7r)n(2)]  < e. 
The incentive compatibility constraint take the following form: 
(6)  V(n) ?  icV(m(1))  + (1-7r)  V(m(2)), 
(7)  0[7im(l) + (1 -7r)m(2)]  > On. 
The second incentive compatibility constraint implies that the expected level of 
consumption associated with the lottery must be at least as great as the sure level 
of consumption if the type 2 agents are to choose the lottery. Because the type 1 
agents are risk averse while the type 2 agents are risk neutral, the type 2 agents 
will always pick the lottery if the type 1 agents do. There exist however certain 
lotteries and  levels  of  n such  that  the  type  1 agent  picks  the certain level  of 
consumption  while the type 2 agent picks the lottery. Following  Prescott and 
Townsend, set n =  c*(1), m(1) = 0, and (1 -7r)  = c*(2)/m(2).  The expected utility 
of the lottery to a type 2 agent is, by construction, equal to Oc*(2).  As m(2) goes to 
infinity, the variance of the lottery also goes to infinity. There exists a m(2) large 
enough so that the type 1 agents prefers c*(1) with certainty to the lottery, even 
though the expected return of the lottery is higher. Because they are risk neutral, 
the type 2 agents always prefers the lottery. 
By allowing for randomization, allocation  rules are attained with associated 
expected utilities that match those when agents' types are public information. If 
we were to graph the expected level of consumption of the type 1 agent against 
that of the type 2 agent, the diagram would look exactly like that of Diagram 1 
except that  the incentive feasible set would  be  everything on  or below  the 45 
degree line, excluding  the horizontal  axis. The feasible set  under deterministic 
allocation rules would be unchanged. Thus, within the space of expected levels of 
consumption the use of random allocation rules has expanded the set of feasible 
allocations. Note  that this allowed for Pareto superior allocations because it was 
optimal to have the expected consumption of the more risk averse agent be less 
than that of the less risk averse agent. There is probably some general sense in 252  HAROLD  LINH  COLE 
which  this must  be true for randomized allocations  to  dominate  deterministic 
allocations. 
3.  CONCLUSION 
Differences in preferences among agents allow one to elicit information about 
them from their choices. Agents can be separated by type even when their types 
are private information. By allowing for random allocation  rules, one not only 
shifts from a potentially nonconvex to a convex space, as noted by Prescott and 
Townsend, but also enables the planner to screen agents based on their degree of 
risk aversion. To the extent that agents have differences in their attitude towards 
risk, lotteries can  be used  to  separate agents and  attain  Pareto  superior allo- 
cations. The incentive feasible set need not be nonconvex  for there to  be gains 
from introducing lotteries. 
University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. 
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